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INTRODUCTION
Municipal governments exercise great power over the lives of their
constituents. In “a number of policy areas,” municipalities “have long
exercised significant regulatory authority.”1 They are, for example, “the
most important and powerful regulator of land uses and thus of housing
supply.”2 As the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted, they have broad
authority over matters of public health.3 And to name just a few more
examples, municipalities extensively regulate the local economy, provide
public services, and distribute public benefits.4 Municipalities regulate all

*

Appellate Attorney, Husch Blackwell LLP, Madison, Wisconsin. J.D., University of
Wisconsin Law School. Special thanks to Kirsten Atanasoff, Rebecca Furdek, Caleb
Gerbitz, Michael Klebanov, and Daniel Suhr for their comments, critique, and support. All
opinions are mine alone.
1. Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 588 (2017).
See generally WIS. STAT. §§ 59.01–66.1341 (2022).
2. David Schleicher, Exclusionary Zoning’s Confused Defenders, 2021 WIS. L. REV.
1315, 1352; accord Davidson, supra note 1, at 588 (“A prime example is land use control
and the regulation of the built environment.”); see, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 59.69, 62.231 (2022).
3. See Nikki C. Day, Jennifer R. Cowan & Noah M. Daiker, Governing Through the
“New Normal”: Covid-19 Lessons Learned on Local Government Law, the Constitution,
and Balancing Rights in Times of Crises, 50 STETSON L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2021); see also
WIS. STAT. § 252.03 (2022); Davidson, supra note 1, at 589–90.
4. See Davidson, supra note 1, at 590–92.
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these areas primarily by enacting and enforcing ordinances. How
ordinances are interpreted thus matters a lot, both for municipal
governments and regulated parties.
Even so, scant attention has been paid to how courts interpret municipal
ordinances. That is especially true compared to the constant focus on how
courts interpret federal and state administrative rules, statutes, and
constitutional provisions. In particular, jurists and scholars have spilled
much ink about judicial deference to administrative agency interpretation
of law. Arguments about Chevron deference, Auer deference, and their
state analogues are all the rage.5
Wisconsin presents an ideal case study on the relationship between
agency-deference principles and municipal-ordinance interpretation. As
recounted below, Wisconsin courts once deferred to agency interpretations
of statutes and rules under certain circumstances. But, in 2018, in Tetra
Tech EC, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,6 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ended that practice. For several years, Wisconsin courts
have also deferred to municipalities’ interpretations of their ordinances
under certain circumstances. In many ways, this practice resembles preTetra Tech agency deference. Indeed, both deference doctrines instruct
courts to defer to a non-judicial actor’s interpretation of ambiguous law so
long as it is reasonable.
This Essay explores judicial deference to municipal interpretation of
ordinances and Tetra Tech’s effect on that deference. Part I briefly
describes Wisconsin’s pre-Tetra Tech agency deference doctrine. It then
reviews the multiple grounds on which the Tetra Tech court relied to end
that deference. Part II details Wisconsin’s doctrine of deference to
municipal interpretations of ordinances. Part III considers whether Tetra
Tech’s reasoning and holding extend to municipal deference. Finally, Part
IV briefly remarks on states other than Wisconsin, noting that Wisconsin’s
experience is shared elsewhere and has potentially broad application. This
Essay ultimately concludes that all of Tetra Tech’s bases for assailing
agency deference — constitutional structure, due process, and prudential
concerns — also apply to municipal deference. Based on Tetra Tech, then,
municipal deference must fall — or already has fallen.
I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATION
Before June 2018, Wisconsin courts adhered to a framework of binding
deference to administrative agency interpretations of law.
While

5. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A
Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018).
6. 914 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. 2018).
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acknowledging that “statutory interpretation is a question of law which
courts decide de novo,” courts simultaneously declared they would “defer
to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute in certain
situations.”7 Starting with roots in the late 1800s,8 Wisconsin’s deference
framework evolved over time to eventually become a “three-level test.”9
The three levels were “great weight” deference, “due weight” deference,
and no deference.10
Great weight deference was triggered when statutory language was
ambiguous and four additional factors were satisfied: (1) the legislature had
“charged” the agency “with the duty of administering the statute;” (2) the
agency’s interpretation was “one of long-standing;” (3) the agency
“employed its expertise or specialized knowledge in forming [its]
interpretation;” and (4) “the agency’s interpretation will provide uniformity
and consistency in the application of the statute.”11 When these
preconditions were met, a reviewing court had to adopt the agency’s
interpretation “so long as it [was] reasonable.”12
A “reasonable”
interpretation was one that did not “directly contravene[] the words of the
statute” and was not “clearly contrary to legislative intent” or “without
rational basis.”13 The court had to defer even if, in its own view, “another
interpretation was more reasonable” than the agency’s interpretation.14
Due weight deference was triggered when (1) statutory language was
ambiguous; (2) the legislature had charged the agency with the duty of
administering the statute; and (3) “the agency [had] some experience in an
area, but [had] not developed the expertise which necessarily places it in a

7. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis.
1995).
8. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 33–38; see also Patience Drake Roggensack, Elected
to Decide: Is the Decision-Avoidance Doctrine of Great Weight Deference Appropriate in
This Court of Last Resort?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 541, 548–60 (2006).
9. Daniel R. Suhr, Interpreting Wisconsin Administrative Law 4 (Aug. 23, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=26300508600412
60741180750170830691050030340080420170921070040790770950001021191130910280
50096020029036111011086004094098122001018007044086045085002116103121121090
02902502601402000412209411910102100410909310608510408309907112102209110907
4086092110026106&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE [https://perma.cc/GJ88-ZU63]; see also
Salvatore Massa, The Standards of Review for Agency Interpretation in Wisconsin, 83
MARQ. L. REV. 597, 607 (2000).
10. See Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102.
11. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 31 (quoting Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 102); see also
UFE, Inc. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n, 548 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Wis. 1996); Massa, supra
note 9, at 602–03.
12. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 31.
13. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Harnischfeger, 539 N.W.2d at 662).
14. Id. at 32 (emphasis added) (quoting Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Lab. & Indus.
Rev. Comm’n, 664 N.W.2d 651, 659 (Wis. 2003)).
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better position to make judgments regarding the interpretation of the statute
than a court.”15 When these preconditions were met, a reviewing court had
to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation — except “[i]f [the] court
[found] an alternative interpretation more reasonable.”16 Faced with a tie
between two equally reasonable interpretations, a court had to favor the
agency’s interpretation.17
No deference was applied when statutory language was unambiguous or
“when the issue [was] one of first impression for the agency and the agency
lack[ed] special expertise or experience in determining the question
presented.”18 Under those circumstances, courts simply undertook their
traditional role of interpreting and applying the law.
In addition to statutes, courts also deferred to agency interpretations of
their own administrative rules.19 Only two levels of deference were
applied: great weight and no deference. Great weight deference for rules
was “similar to the great weight standard applied to statutory
interpretations” and “turn[ed] on whether the agency’s interpretation [was]
reasonable and consistent with the meaning or purpose of the regulation or
statute.”20 In other words, when an agency offered a reasonable
interpretation of its own administrative rule, a court had to accept that
interpretation.
In Tetra Tech, the Wisconsin Supreme Court “end[ed] [the] practice of
deferring to administrative agencies’ conclusions of law.”21 Although five
of seven justices agreed with that outcome, the reasoning was fractured.
The lead opinion, which announced the court’s judgment, was authored by
Justice Daniel Kelly and joined by Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley.22
Multiple concurring opinions were also filed.23
The lead opinion reasoned that agency deference violated state
constitutional structure and due process. Starting with the former, the
15. Id. (quoting UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 57).
16. UFE, 548 N.W.2d at 62–63.
17. See ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 648 N.W.2d 854, 877 (Wis.
2002) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he agency’s legal interpretation will be upheld even if
there is a different, equally reasonable interpretation — in other words, a tie goes to the
agency.”); see also Suhr, supra note 9, at 7.
18. Kitten v. State Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 644 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Wis. 2002); see
also Massa, supra note 9, at 603–04.
19. See Suhr, supra note 9, at 7.
20. Id. (quoting Marder v. Univ. of Wis., 687 N.W.2d 832, 839 n.3 (Wis. Ct. App.
2004)).
21. 914 N.W.2d 21, 45 (Wis. 2018). Tetra Tech has since been codified. See WIS. STAT.
§ 227.57(11) (2022) (“Upon review of an agency action or decision, the court shall accord
no deference to the agency’s interpretation of law.”).
22. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 28–29 n.4.
23. See infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
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Wisconsin Constitution creates three separate branches of state government
and vests each with a distinct power.24 This structural separation bars any
branch from encroaching onto another’s core power or from abdicating its
own core and transferring it elsewhere.25
Specifically, the Wisconsin Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial
power of this state shall be vested in [the courts].”26 At its core, “judicial
power” means the power and duty (1) to apply law to adjudicate disputes;27
(2) in the course of adjudicating disputes, to interpret the law and ascertain
its meaning; and (3) to decide in accord with higher-order law when
multiple sources of law conflict.28 Given the separation of powers and the
vesting of “judicial power” in the courts, the lead opinion reasoned that
“only the judiciary may authoritatively interpret and apply the law in cases
before our courts.”29 “[B]ecause that power belongs to the judiciary — and
the judiciary alone — [courts] may not allow an administrative agency to
exercise it.”30 Yet when they apply deference, courts “cede to the agency”
the “core judicial power” to “authoritatively interpret the law . . . and apply
the law to the case.”31 Constitutional structure, therefore, forbids courts
from deferring to agency interpretations of law.
The Tetra Tech lead opinion also concluded that agency deference was
incompatible with the due-process right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.”32
Deference was often, if not always, applied in cases where “[the] agency
appear[ed] in . . . court[] as a party.”33 Once deference was triggered,
courts effectively “receive[d] instruction from the [agency] on how to
interpret and apply the rule of decision.”34 “This systematic favor,” in the
lead opinion’s view, “deprive[d] the non-governmental party of an
24. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 41 n.28.
25. See id. at 41–43. Although “[t]he constitution does not . . . hermetically seal the
branches from each other[,]” each branch’s “[c]ore powers” cannot be “shar[ed].” Id. at 42.
To that end, “[t]he separation of powers prevents [courts] from abdicating core power just as
much as it protects the judiciary from encroachment by other branches.” Id.
26. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
27. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 42–43, 45. In the words of the Tetra Tech lead
opinion, “exercising judgment in the interpretation and application of the law in a particular
case is the very thing that distinguishes the judiciary from the other branches.” Id. at 42.
28. See id.; see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437–40 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803); Joseph S. Diedrich,
Separation, Supremacy, and the Unconstitutional Rational Basis Test, 66 VILL. L. REV. 249,
264–70 (2021) (discussing the judicial power and citing several sources).
29. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 45.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 48–50 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see also State v.
Herrmann, 867 N.W.2d 772, 778 (Wis. 2015) (applying the principle in Wisconsin).
33. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 48–49.
34. Id. at 49.
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independent and impartial tribunal.”35 In no small way, the agency
“interpret[ed] and applie[d] the law in a case to which it [was] a party,”
thereby unlawfully “acting as judge of its own cause.”36
For the lead opinion, great weight and due weight deference both raised
the same constitutional concerns; any difference was a matter of degree.37
Systematic, binding deference in any form could not stand. At the same
time, the lead opinion noted that an agency’s views on interpretation
deserved respect “as matter of persuasion, not deference.”38 The agency, to
that end, must “explain how its experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge give its view of the law a significance or perspective
unique amongst the parties, and why that background should make [its]
view of the law more persuasive than others.”39 An agency that regularly
administers a statute might indeed have persuasive points to offer. But just
like any other party, the agency must demonstrate that to the court by
explanation and persuasion. No longer does an agency get a benefit simply
because it is an agency.
Justice Annette Ziegler, joined in part by Chief Justice Patience
Roggensack, filed a concurring opinion. She favored ending deference on
non-constitutional grounds: “Deference to administrative agencies was a
court-created doctrine and, thus, is one that can be court eliminated.”40
Ruling on constitutional grounds, Ziegler reasoned, was unnecessary and
raised thorny questions about the validity of past decisions in which courts
had deferred to agency interpretation.41
Justice Michael Gableman, joined by Chief Justice Roggensack, also
filed a concurring opinion. “Deference is simply unsound in principle,” he
wrote, because it “leads to the perverse outcome of courts often affirming
inferior interpretations of statutes.”42 Rather, “erroneous-but-reasonable
legal conclusions,” which deference had allowed to pass, should be

35. Id. at 50.
36. Id.; see also id. at 49 (quoting Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1187, 1212 (2016) (“[W]hen judges defer to the executive’s view of the law, they
display systematic bias toward one of the parties.”)); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d
1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Transferring the job of saying what
the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the very sort of dueprocess (fair notice) and equal-protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the
political branches intruded on judicial functions.”). Due process, in some ways, can be
understood as a structural guarantee. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012).
37. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 51–52.
38. Id. at 53.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67 (Ziegler, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 67–69.
42. Id. at 75 (Gableman, J., concurring).
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“corrected.”43 In addition, Gableman noted that “[d]eference is based on
the theory that administrative agencies develop expertise in their realm.”44
He argued that this theory had been proven doubtful and therefore could
not support a coherent deference doctrine.45
Invoking stare decisis, Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Shirley
Abrahamson would have kept the pre-Tetra Tech deference framework in
place.46 They also disagreed with the lead opinion’s constitutionalstructure conclusions on the grounds that even with deference, “[t]he court
itself must always interpret the statute to determine the reasonableness of
the agency interpretation.”47 So long as a court at least participated in the
interpretive endeavor, no separation-of-powers concerns arose.
Although Tetra Tech was a statutory-interpretation case, nothing about
its holding appears limited to agency interpretations of statutes. The court
jettisoned the entire existing agency-deference framework, which had
included agency interpretations of both statutes and administrative rules.48
It comes as no surprise, then, that a Wisconsin Court of Appeals panel
recently invoked Tetra Tech to reject an administrative agency’s request for
deference to that agency’s interpretation of its own rule.49

43. Id. Although not expressly invoking the Constitution, Justice Gableman’s reasoning
in this regard arguably “depends on the separation of powers.” Id. at 55 (lead opinion).
44. Id. at 76 (Gableman, J., concurring) (“[A]n . . . important principle of administrative
law is that, in recognition of the expertise and experience possessed by agencies, courts will
defer to their interpretation of statutes in certain situations.” (quoting Barron Elec. Coop. v.
PSC, 569 N.W.2d 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997))).
45. See id. For instance, “some agency decisions are made by a single hearing examiner
— of unknown expertise or experience.” Id. (citing Roggensack, supra note 8, at 557). So
too, “it is possible for multi-member agency review boards to lack substantial experience or
expertise.” Id. (citing Roggensack, supra note 8, at 558).
46. See id. at 64–65 (Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Racine-Harley Davidson, Inc. v.
State, 717 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 2006)).
47. Id. at 65. Indeed, some have argued that agency deference is supported — or even
required — by the separation of powers, because such deference helps keep courts from
substituting their judgment for that of the political branches. See Craig Green, Chevron
Debates and the Constitutional Transformation of Administrative Law, 88 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 654, 667–78 (2020); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive
Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277–78, 283,
285 (1988).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20.
49. See Green Bay Sportservice, Inc. v. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 921 N.W.2d 518, 519
(Wis. Ct. App. 2018) (reasoning that, because Tetra Tech “‘end[ed] [the] practice of
deferring to administrative agencies’ conclusions of law,’” the court would “give no
deference to [the Department of Workforce Development’s] interpretation of [the
Department’s own administrative rule]” (quoting Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 63)).
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II. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO MUNICIPAL INTERPRETATION
Tetra Tech “end[ed] [the] practice of deferring to administrative
agencies” interpretations of statutes and agency rules.50 But agency
deference is not the only deference doctrine Wisconsin courts have
embraced. At least up until Tetra Tech, Wisconsin courts also applied a
framework of binding deference to municipal interpretations of law under
certain circumstances.51
The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s most recent extended discussion of
municipal deference appears in Ottman v. Town of Primrose.52 Just like
pre-Tetra Tech agency deference cases, Ottman recites that a court’s review
of questions of law — including both statutes and municipal ordinances —
is de novo.53 On the one hand, Ottman does not envision deference to a
municipality’s interpretation of a statute.54 On the other hand, it does
require courts to defer to “a municipality’s interpretation and application of
its own ordinance.”55
Ottman, like pre-Tetra Tech agency deference cases, sets a trigger for
deference. Start with what does not receive deference: ordinances that are
either unambiguous or not “unique.” Some ordinances, the Ottman court
observed, “parrot” a state statute or statewide standard and are not unique.56
For this category of ordinance, courts do not defer to a municipality’s

50. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 63.
51. Just as agency deference most often arose in judicial review of agency decisions in
which the agency was a party to litigation, municipal deference most often arises in judicial
review of municipal decisions (known as certiorari) in which the municipality is a party.
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 59.694(10), 62.23(7) (2022); Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 796
N.W.2d 411, 420 (Wis. 2011) (“Certiorari is a mechanism by which a court may test the
validity of a decision rendered by a municipality, an administrative agency, or an inferior
tribunal.”). Direct attacks on municipal ordinances — brought as declaratory-judgment
actions or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — also feature the municipality (or a municipal official)
as a party and sometimes implicate deference doctrines. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. City of
Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e consider the City’s own
authoritative construction of the ordinance, including its implementation and interpretation
and defer to that construction so long as its interpretation is based on a permissible
construction.” (quoting Southlake Prop. Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Morrow, 112 F.3d 1114,
1119 (11th Cir. 1997))).
52. 796 N.W.2d 411. Although it may not have the historical pedigree of pre-Tetra Tech
administrative deference, municipal deference existed well before Ottman. See, e.g., Weber
v. Town of Saukville, 562 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Wis. 1997); Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 498
N.W.2d 842, 850 (Wis. 1993); State ex rel. B’nai B’rith Found. v. Walworth Cnty. Bd. of
Adjustment, 208 N.W.2d 113, 118–20 (Wis. 1973).
53. See Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 424; see also Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 31.
54. See Park 6 LLC v. City of Racine, 824 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012).
55. Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 424.
56. Id. at 425.
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interpretation: “Doing so would give one locality disproportionate authority
to influence state standards established by the legislature.”57
By contrast, other ordinances contain language that “appears to be
unique.”58 When language is “drafted by the municipality in an effort to
address a local concern,” the court reasoned, the “municipality may be
uniquely poised to determine what that ordinance means.”59 Courts faced
with ambiguous, unique ordinance language must defer to a municipality’s
reasonable interpretation. An interpretation is “unreasonable” if it “directly
contravenes the words of the ordinance” or is “contrary to law,” “clearly
contrary to . . . intent, history, or purpose of the ordinance,” or “without a
rational basis.”60
At issue in Ottman was the Town of Primrose’s driveway ordinance:
No driveway shall be approved in the Town of Primrose if the Town
Board finds that the driveway will adversely impact productive
agricultural land, unless . . . the person requesting the permit can show
that the parcel to be served by the driveway is capable of producing at
least $6000.00 of gross income per year.61

The Town and the Ottmans advanced opposing interpretations of the
“capable of producing” language. The former argued the language required
evidence of actual income produced by the parcel in the past; the latter
argued that it required only evidence of potential income.62 The court, for
its part, determined that the ordinance was ambiguous; and, because it did
not “parrot the language of a state statute,” the ordinance was “unique.”63
It then applied deference, concluding that “[t]he Ottmans have not met their
burden of showing that the [Town’s] interpretation is unreasonable.”64
It takes no special glasses to immediately see many similarities between
Ottman-style municipal deference and pre-Tetra Tech agency deference —
particularly great weight deference to agency interpretations of agency
rules. Ottman and its predecessors, in fact, expressly “borrowed from
[now-abrogated] cases setting forth the framework for reviewing
administrative agency determinations.”65 Both deference doctrines are

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 416 (quoting Town of Primrose Driveway Ordinance 1.10).
62. See id. at 426.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 427.
65. See id. at 425; see also Marris v. City of Cedarburg, 498 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Wis.
1993); Schroeder v. Dane Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 596 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999). But see infra text accompanying notes 84–88.
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deployed when the law’s language is ambiguous and an additional trigger
— uniqueness or the agency-deference factors — is met. Both instruct
courts to defer to a non-judicial actor’s interpretation of law unless it is
“unreasonable,” with unreasonable defined to mean directly contrary to
text, clearly contrary to intent, or without rational basis.66 Both require
courts to defer even when they identify a more reasonable interpretation.67
And, as Ottman aptly demonstrates, both can be effectively outcomedeterminative.68 These immediate similarities prompt the question: what, if
anything, did Tetra Tech do to Wisconsin’s municipal-deference doctrine?
III. TETRA TECH’S EFFECT ON MUNICIPAL DEFERENCE
This Part discusses Tetra Tech’s effect on municipal deference. It
considers whether Tetra Tech’s underlying grounds — constitutional
structure, due process, and prudential concerns — call municipal deference
into doubt like they did agency deference. And it concludes they all do.
Although Tetra Tech dealt with agency interpretations of law, its central
guiding principle — that courts must independently interpret law when
exercising their judicial power — applies equally to municipal
interpretations.69 Any honest reading of Tetra Tech spells the end of
municipal deference, too.
Constitutional Structure. First, consider Tetra Tech’s constitutionalstructure argument. To be sure, Tetra Tech was dealing with an agency
deference framework that involved state courts deferring to state executiveagency interpretations. For the lead opinion, at least, agency deference
contravened horizontal separation-of-powers principles; one branch cannot
exercise another branch’s core power.70 But such horizontal principles
themselves derive from (or at least exist alongside) a more fundamental
source — the Wisconsin Constitution’s vesting clauses. In particular, the
judicial vesting clause provides that “[t]he judicial power of this state shall
be vested in [the courts].”71 The lead opinion begins its structural analysis
by quoting the judicial vesting clause,72 nods to its implications multiple

66. Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 424; see also Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 30–32.
67. See Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 425–27; see also Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 32.
68. See Roggensack, supra note 8, at 559 (“The court’s decision often is driven by the
level of deference that is applied.”).
69. To date, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not explicitly considered whether Tetra
Tech extends to municipal deference. One court of appeals panel noted that the argument
was presented, but it declined to decide one way or another. See Watkins v. Pension Bd. of
Emps. Ret. Sys. of Cnty. of Milwaukee, 943 N.W.2d 349, 349 (Wis. Ct. App.) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
70. See supra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
71. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
72. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 40.
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times,73 and ultimately concludes that “only the judiciary may
authoritatively interpret and apply the law in cases before our courts.”74 In
other words, Tetra Tech’s constitutional-structure argument does not
depend on the horizontal relationship between the non-judicial interpreter
and the judicial interpreter. It rather depends on the judiciary being the
only branch vested with constitutional authority to exercise core judicial
power.
With this in mind, Tetra Tech stands for the proposition that courts may
not divest or “cede” their core judicial power and “shar[e]” it with an
executive agency or any other actor.75 Less than two weeks after Tetra
Tech, in fact, the Wisconsin Supreme Court invoked that case’s holding
beyond state-agency interpretations to reject an argument for deference to a
private university’s interpretation of law.76 This shows the Supreme Court
does not understand Tetra Tech’s holding to be limited to agency
interpretations. The lead opinion can quite comfortably be altered to
embrace the notion that “only the judiciary may authoritatively interpret
and apply [ordinances] in cases before our courts.”77
What’s more, any structural differences between state agencies and
municipalities do not appear to matter for purposes of deference.78 State
agencies are “creatures of the legislature” and derive their power entirely
from statutes.79 Although not state-level bodies, municipalities are likewise
“creatures of the state legislature that have no inherent right of self-

73. See id. at 42–45; accord Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); Gabler v.
Crime Victims Rts. Bd., 897 N.W.2d 384, 397–98 (Wis. 2017).
74. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 45.
75. Id. at 42, 45; cf. Philip Hamburger, Delegating or Divesting?, 115 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 88, 108–10 (2020) (relying on constitutional vesting clauses to argue that “Congress
cannot divest itself of the powers that the Constitution vests in it”); Philip Hamburger,
Nondelegation Blues 64–70 (Mar. 7, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://deliverypdf
.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=047093101091071106064125092102086067010037073076067
05209408012112702902711308501112609905403812704201009806608212410600507008
80980480310000850820020990030721100760510160841270800300810900660720000870
25123096008080019004099065110079011072127000103004&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE
[https://perma.cc/F9NR-2QPG].
76. See McAdams v. Marquette Univ., 914 N.W.2d 708, 727–29 (Wis. 2018).
77. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 45.
78. Nestor Davidson has suggested that varying municipal organizational structures
support varying approaches to deference: “[A] framework of judicial deference sensitive to
local context on grounds such as structure and expertise might play out differently.”
Davidson, supra note 1, at 621. Davidson’s argument, however, presumes the
constitutionality and wisdom of an agency deference doctrine. Because Wisconsin has
abandoned agency deference, Davidson’s arguments do not apply.
79. Myers v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 922 N.W.2d 47, 52 (Wis. 2019)
(“[A]dministrative agencies are creatures of the legislature. An administrative agency has
only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied by the statutory provisions
under which it operates.”).
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government beyond the powers expressly granted to them.” 80 True enough,
cities and villages — unlike agencies — have “home rule” authority, which
affords them a certain degree of constitutional authority to govern local
affairs.81 But that home-rule authority is expressly “subject . . . to [this]
constitution” and has never been interpreted to alter the constitution’s
judicial vesting clause or otherwise divest any core judicial power from
courts.82 Municipalities have no more core judicial power under the
constitution than do state agencies.83
As mentioned, Ottman and similar cases “borrowed from [nowabrogated] cases setting forth the framework for reviewing administrative
agency determinations” to build Wisconsin’s municipal-deference
doctrine.84 The Ottman court also stated, however, that it was “declin[ing]
to graft [the pre-Tetra Tech agency-deference] framework wholesale onto
[the] framework for reviewing municipal decisions.”85 Why? Because
agency deference, but not municipal deference, presents horizontal
separation issues; and because agencies, but not municipalities, are
“charged by the legislature with the administration of a state statute.”86
Although these observations may explain why pre-Tetra Tech and Ottman
deference do not look exactly alike, neither reduces how forcefully Tetra
Tech’s constitutional-structure argument applies to municipal deference.
As already explained, the essence of that argument is not about horizontal
separation but rather divestment of core judicial power. Moreover, while
municipalities may not “administer” statutes in the same way agencies do,

80. Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 892 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Wis. 2017) (quoting
Black v. City of Milwaukee, 882 N.W.2d 333, 343 (Wis. 2016)) (discussing cities); see also
Jackson Cnty. v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 717 N.W.2d 713, 720 (Wis. 2006) (“A county is
a creature of the legislature and as such, it has only those powers that the legislature by
statute provided.”); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 607 N.W.2d 50,
52 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“Agencies, municipal corporations and quasi-municipal
corporations are all creatures of the state and their powers are only those ascribed to them by
the state.”).
81. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(1) (“Cities and villages organized pursuant to state law may
determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such
enactments of the legislature of statewide concern as with uniformity shall affect every city
or every village.”). Counties have similar statutory home-rule authority. See WIS. STAT. §
59.03(1) (2022).
82. State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 253 N.W.2d 505, 506 (Wis. 1977). Instead, the
“home rule amendment accomplishes two things, in some measure distinct: (1) It makes a
direct grant of legislative power to municipalities; and (2) it limits the legislature in the
exercise of its general grant of legislative power.” Id. (emphasis added).
83. The one exception may be municipal courts, see WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 2, which are
rarely if ever implicated in municipal-deference cases.
84. Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 796 N.W.2d 411, 425 (Wis. 2011).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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their authority still similarly derives from statutes.87 To be sure, pre-Tetra
Tech courts deferred to agency interpretations of statutes, whereas courts
do not defer to municipal interpretations of statutes. But pre-Tetra Tech
courts also deferred to agency interpretations of their own rules — just like
Ottman instructs courts to defer to municipalities’ interpretations of their
own ordinances.88
Due Process. Second, consider Tetra Tech’s due-process argument.
Agency deference primarily arose in cases where “that agency appears
in . . . court[] as a party.”89 So too does municipal deference usually, if not
always, arise in cases where the municipality is a party.90 And, just like
with agency deference, once a court determines that deference applies, it
then “receives instruction from the governmental party on how to interpret
and apply the rule of decision.”91 The municipality “interprets and applies
the law in a case to which it is a party,” thereby “acting as judge of its own
cause.”92 Just like agency deference, municipal deference “systematic[ally]
favor[s]” the municipality and “deprives the non-governmental party of an
independent and impartial tribunal.”93
Prudential Arguments.
Third, consider Tetra Tech’s prudential
arguments. Like agency deference, municipal deference is a judicially
created doctrine. Echoed by all the other justices agreeing in the outcome,
Justice Gableman decried agency deference as “unsound in principle”: it
“[led] to the perverse outcome of courts often affirming inferior
interpretations of statutes” because courts had to defer even when they
identified a more reasonable interpretation.94 This reasoning applies with
equal force to municipal deference.
Justice Gableman also noted that agency deference was “based on the
theory that administrative agencies develop expertise in their realm.”95 But
because this basis was not necessarily true (at least not uniformly), he
reasoned it did not justify the agency-deference doctrine.96 Similarly,
municipal deference is based on the theory that municipalities and their

87. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 19, 48–49 and accompanying text.
89. See Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 48 (Wis. 2018).
90. See supra note 52.
91. Tetra Tech, 913 N.W.2d at 49.
92. Id. at 50.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 75 (Gableman, J., concurring); see also id. at 54–55 (lead opinion); id. at 67
(Ziegler, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 75–76 (Gableman, J., concurring); see also Massa, supra note 9, at 598–99.
96. See Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 75–76 (Gableman, J., concurring).
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officials develop expertise in their locality.97 The doubts raised by Justice
Gableman apply to the municipal realm as well. Consider, for instance,
how “[q]uick turnover rates and changing political administrations mean
agencies — and the people staffing them — do not always come with the
presupposed experience or knowledge.”98 This is just as true for
municipalities, with frequent elections for policymaking roles.99 To be
sure, agencies and municipalities have particular expertise, and it may
make good sense to defer to their evaluation of facts and circumstances to
which they are close. But interpreting law is the domain and expertise of
courts. One need not reject the general concept of comparative institutional
competence to accept that courts know most about interpreting law; that is
what generalist judges, trained and experienced in the law, do every day. 100
One more prudential critique bears mention. Pre-Tetra Tech agency
deference was applied when a statute or rule was ambiguous and when a
multi-factor test was satisfied. Among other things, the test considered
whether the agency interpretation was “long-standing” and whether the
agency had “employed its expertise or specialized knowledge.”101 This test
was criticized as overly malleable, meaning deference was inconsistently
and unpredictably applied.102 Municipal deference, for its part, is applied
when an ordinance is ambiguous and “unique.”103 But what constitutes
uniqueness? Ottman only says an ordinance that “parrots” a state statute is
not unique.104 But what if multiple municipalities have the same or similar

97. See Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 425 (“[T]he municipality may be uniquely poised to
determine what that ordinance means.”).
98. Amy Buchmeyer, Note, When Roles Collide: Deference, Due Process, and the
Judicial Dilemma, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1589, 1616; see also Roggensack, supra note 8, at
557–58 (2006); Alexander D. Bolton, John M. de Figueiredo & David E. Lewis, Elections,
Ideology, and Turnover in the U.S. Federal Government 2, 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 22932, 2019).
99. See, e.g., MADISON, WIS. ORDINANCE §§ 3.01(1), 3.03(1) (2022) (stating that alders
are elected to two-year terms and the mayor is elected to a four-year term). By contrast,
Supreme Court justices are elected for ten-year terms, WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4(1), and
Court of Appeals and circuit court judges are elected for six-year terms. Id. § 5(2).
100. See Buchmeyer, supra note 98, at 1616; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct.
1204, 1249 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that at least as an original matter, “the
interpretation of legal texts, even vague ones, remained an exercise of core judicial power”);
Diedrich, supra note 28, at 266 (citing similar statements).
101. Tetra Tech, 914 N.W.2d at 31 (quoting Harnischfeger Corp. v. Lab. & Indus. Rev.
Comm’n, 539 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Wis. 1995)).
102. See Massa, supra note 9, at 619–20; see also Suhr, supra note 9, at 6. Jack
Beermann has raised similar administrability concerns about the comparable federal agency
deference doctrine. See generally Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment
Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 779 (2010).
103. Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 796 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Wis. 2011).
104. Id.
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ordinance language? Municipalities often copy each other or borrow from
sample ordinances.105
Moreover, Ottman cryptically suggests that
“uniqueness” may have something to do with “local concern.”106 But is it
the concern that must be unique, the ordinance language addressing it, or
both? For example, two cities may have identical (not unique) land-use
concerns but regulate that concern using different (unique) language.
“Unique,” in short, is susceptible to the same criticisms lodged against the
agency-deference standard.
In sum, all of Tetra Tech’s arguments assailing agency deference —
constitutional structure, due process, and prudential concerns — equally
assail municipal deference.
Tetra Tech signals, or perhaps even
accomplishes, the end of municipal deference, too.
Of course, none of this is to say a municipality’s interpretation might not
constitutionally and prudently serve as evidence of an ordinance’s
meaning.107 Yet, just like Tetra Tech said about agency deference, this “is
a matter of persuasion, not deference.”108 A municipality must “explain
how its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge give
its view of the law a significance or perspective unique amongst the parties,
and why that background should make [its] view of the law more
persuasive than others.”109
IV. OTHER STATES
Its recent treatment of agency deference and municipal deference make
the Wisconsin Supreme Court a prime specimen for study. That said, the
deference doctrines and corresponding implications discussed above arise
— to a greater or lesser extent — in nearly every state. And while a
fulsome exploration of every state’s deference practices lies well beyond
the scope of this Essay, a few general comments are in order.

105. See
Sample
Ordinances,
LEAGUE
WIS.
MUNS.,
https://www.lwminfo.org/328/Ordinances [https://perma.cc/8H2D-BT4G] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) (“The
League receives copies of ordinances from member municipalities to use as samples for
other municipalities considering similar issues.”).
106. Ottman, 796 N.W.2d at 424.
107. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 336 n.413 (1994) (“While an interpreter may be
persuaded or influenced in the exercise of her own judgment by the views and reasoning of
another, any theory that accords decision-altering weight to the views of another, contrary to
the interpreter’s settled conviction as to the proper interpretation of the provision at issue, is
fundamentally illegitimate.”).
108. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 53 (Wis. 2018).
109. Id.
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First, different states’ courts vary in whether and how they defer to
agency interpretations of statutes and rules.110 Many states apply a
Chevron-like heavy deference framework; others apply no systematic
deference at all; and others still apply unique hybrid tests.111 Like
Wisconsin in Tetra Tech, courts in a few other states have ended deference
to agency interpretations, including by relying on constitutional
principles.112 Second, similar to Wisconsin in Ottman, many other states
embrace some form of deference to municipal interpretation of
ordinances.113 Regarding the interaction between agency-deference rules
and municipal-deference rules, two states in particular merit brief attention.

110. See Aaron Saiger, Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 555, 557–60 (2014); see also Luke Phillips, Comment, Chevron in the
States? Not So Much, 89 MISS. L.J. 313, 315, 321–64 (2020). Federal courts defer to agency
interpretation of statutes and rules, at least under certain circumstances. See Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (2019); see also Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 864–65 (1984).
111. See Phillips, supra note 110, at 321–64; see also Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping
in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their Implications for Improving the
Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 984–1007, 1010–24 (2008).
112. See, e.g., King v. Miss. Mil. Dep’t, 245 So. 3d 404, 408 (Miss. 2018); Ellis-Hall
Consultants v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 379 P.3d 1270, 1274 (Utah 2016); In re Complaint of
Rovas, 754 N.W.2d 259, 275 (Mich. 2008); Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d
378, 382–83 (Del. 1999). So too have several U.S. Supreme Court justices lodged similar
objections to analogous federal deference doctrines. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A]s originally understood,” the judicial
power requires a court “to exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding
upon the laws,” “including ambiguous ones administered by an agency.” (quoting Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring))); see also
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437–39 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Pereira v.
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290, 315–16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See generally Walker, supra note
5. Finally, some states have ended deference legislatively. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12910(F) (2022) (“In a proceeding brought by or against the regulated party, the court shall
decide all questions of law, including the interpretation of a constitutional or statutory
provision or a rule adopted by an agency, without deference to any previous determination
that may have been made on the question by the agency.”); WIS. STAT. § 227.57(11) (2022)
(“Upon review of an agency action or decision, the court shall accord no deference to the
agency’s interpretation of law.”).
113. See, e.g., Berkeley Hills Watershed Coal. v. City of Berkeley, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 236,
248 (Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (“[A] city’s interpretation of its own ordinance is entitled to great
weight unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized.” (quoting Anderson First Coal. v. City
of Anderson, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1193 (Dist. Ct. App. 2005))); Bd. of Supervisors of
Fairfax Cnty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax Cnty., 626 S.E.2d 374, 382 (Va. 2006)
(“A consistent administrative construction of an ordinance by the officials charges with its
enforcement is entitled to great weight.” (quoting Masterson v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of
City of Va. Beach, 353 S.E.2d 727, 733 (Va. 1987))); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§ 367 (2022); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 340 (2022). Some federal
courts have likewise deferred to municipal interpretations of municipal ordinances. See, e.g.,
Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 454 F.3d 1219, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e consider the
City’s own authoritative construction of the ordinance, including its implementation and
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Similar to Wisconsin before Tetra Tech, Utah courts had at one time
deferred to (1) agency interpretations of rules and (2) municipal
interpretation of municipal ordinances.114 In the mid-2010s, the Utah
Supreme Court ended agency deference.115 It invoked constitutional
structure and due process, reasoning that “defer[ence] to the agency’s
interpretation of law of its own making” ultimately “place[s] the power to
write the law and the power to authoritatively interpret it in the same
hands.”116 Then in 2017, the court held that its grounds for rejecting
agency deference also applied to municipal deference.117 Indeed, the court
added, “there is even less reason to defer to local agencies’ interpretations
of ordinances, given that those local agencies ‘do not possess the same
degree of professional and technical expertise as their state agency
counterparts.’”118
Somewhat similarly, Mississippi courts had, until recently, deferred to
(1) agency interpretation of law and (2) municipal interpretation of
municipal ordinances. In the 2018 decision of King v. Mississippi Military
Department,119 the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on constitutionalstructure principles to end deference to agency interpretation.120 Then in
2021, despite King, a plurality arguably preserved the pre-existing
municipal deference doctrine.121 Multiple justices wrote separately,
arguing that King “is equally applicable to the interpretation of

interpretation and defer to that construction so long as its interpretation is based on a
permissible construction.” (quoting Southlake Prop. Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Morrow, 112
F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1997))).
114. See Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 416 P.3d 389, 394 (Utah 2017);
see also Ellis-Hall Consultants, 379 P.3d at 1273.
115. See Ellis-Hall Consultants, 379 P.3d at 1273–74. The court had previously clarified
that, with respect to statutes, courts have “the de novo prerogative of interpreting the law,
unencumbered by any standard of agency deference.” Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah
Lab. Comm’n, 322 P.3d 712, 718 (Utah 2014).
116. Ellis-Hall Consultants, 379 P.3d at 1275.
117. See Outfront Media, 416 P.3d at 394 n.13.
118. Id. (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 104 P.3d 1208, 1216 (Utah 2004)). As one
prominent treatise notes, “[o]rdinances frequently are drafted without the aid of skilled
technicians, such as are used in the writing of statutes, and probably few ordinances would
withstand too technical, hard and fast rules of construction.” 6 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 20:45 (3d ed. 2005). Although an ordinance’s comparative imprecision
may warrant different interpretive treatment, it does not justify deferring to municipalities
simply because they are municipalities. Quite the opposite, if anything. After all, imprecise
contractual language is typically construed against its drafter. E.g., Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v.
Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010).
119. See generally 245 So. 3d 404 (Miss. 2018).
120. Id. at 408.
121. See Bd. of Supervisors of Hancock Cnty. v. Razz Halili Tr., 320 So. 3d 490, 494
(Miss. 2021) (plurality opinion).
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ordinances.”122 Finally, in 2022, a majority of the Mississippi Supreme
Court formally overturned the precedent that had created the state’s
municipal-deference doctrine.123 The court reasoned that King’s logic —
and the general principle that courts must independently interpret law when
exercising their judicial power — applied just as much to municipal
ordinances and their interpretation.124
Wisconsin’s, Utah’s, and Mississippi’s experiences may translate to
other states. Whether such experiences translate to any particular state will
depend on multiple factors, including the state’s existing deference
practices, its constitutional structure, and its individual judges’ proclivities.
For any state with substantial similarities to Wisconsin, Utah, or
Mississippi, however, judicial deference to municipal interpretation should
be subjected to a healthy dose of scrutiny and doubt.
CONCLUSION
Through a confluence of reasons, Tetra Tech “end[ed] [the] practice of
deferring to administrative agencies’ conclusions of law” in Wisconsin.125
Both before and after Tetra Tech, Wisconsin courts have confirmed that
statutory-interpretation principles apply equally to interpreting
ordinances.126 It follows that if statutory interpretations receive no
deference, then ordinance interpretations do not, either. Following Utah’s
and Mississippi’s examples, Wisconsin courts — and courts in other states
that follow similar legal principles — should make this clear the first
chance they get.

122. Id. at 499–500 (Coleman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 499 (Kitchens, C.J.,
concurring in part and in result).
123. See Wheelan v. City of Gautier, No. 2019-CT-01062-SCT, 2022 WL 325207, at *5
(Miss. Feb. 3, 2022).
124. See id. The court also offered another justification for ending municipal deference.
Citing cases from many jurisdictions, including a pre-Tetra Tech Wisconsin case, the
Wheelan court noted that most state courts adhere to a de novo standard of review when
interpreting ordinances. See id. at *4 (citing, among others, Hambleton v. Friedmann, 344
N.W.2d 212, 213 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)). But as previously suggested, the nominal recitation
of a de novo standard does not imply the absence of deference. Many states, including
Wisconsin before Tetra Tech, purported to both apply de novo review and defer to
reasonable interpretations of administrative rules and ordinances. See supra notes 7, 53, and
accompanying text.
125. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 914 N.W.2d 21, 63 (Wis. 2018).
126. See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 924 N.W.2d 153, 158 (Wis.
2019); see also Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty., 660 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Wis. 2003).

